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| Program > Philosophy meets Sociology |
| Programme > La philosophie rencontre la sociologie |
| Jay
Foster
(University of Toronto) Trust Within Reason |
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The ways in which testimony can be used to justify epistemological claims have been the subject of at least two recent books: Steven Shapin's A Social History of Truth and Anthony Coady's Testimony. Shapin and Coady observe that most statements are accepted as true not on the grounds that they have empirical or logical justification but on the basis of the testimony of others. Moreover, we accept or reject testimony, not for empirical or logical reasons, but for normative reasons, like expertise, trustworthiness and credibility. This paper criticises accounts that use the idea of testimony to justify epistemological claims by arguing that these accounts fail to separate acts of testimony from acts of judgement. In broad terms, testimony consists of statements about states of affairs given by an individual to other individuals. In contrast, judgement is the formation of a belief or conclusion by an individual, typically in the form of an affirmation or denial, and, ideally, it follows deliberation. The paper argues that there is no logical or necessary linkage between testimony and judgement. Testimony from the most expert, trustworthy and credible source does not require favourable judgement, and vice versa. Once testimony and judgement are disentangled, it becomes difficult to reduce epistemological claims to issues about the credibility or trustworthiness of testimony.
Institute
for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology
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