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| Program > Method |
| Programme > Méthode |
| Matthew
D. Lund
(University of Illinois at Chicago) Theory-Laden Observation and the Logic of Discovery |
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Most inquiries into the nature of scientific observation over the past forty years have centered on the objectivity of science. While such discussion has been interesting, the context in which the subject of theory-laden observation (in its present form) originally arose was that of the logic of discovery. These two topics, theory-laden observation and the logic of discovery, have, since Hanson’s Patterns of Discovery, ceased to be treated as closely related subjects. I shall argue that separating these issues is a mistake. Hanson’s primary concern in his discussion of scientific observation was not to demonstrate observation’s lack of objectivity, but to elucidate the process through which perception meshes with knowledge: only through the application of concepts to the data of perception are we able to have an epistemologically useful interaction with the world. However, Hanson was never able to produce a fully articulated theory of concepts, and I shall argue that the vitiating theory-ladenness which seemed a consequence of his account was merely a result of his underdeveloped conceptual story. A more detailed and satisfactory account of concepts, and their role in perception, is given by Fred Dretske in Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Application of Dretske’s framework to the problems dealt with by Hanson will both demonstrate the objectivity of observation and afford some positive prospect for a logic of discovery.
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