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| Program > Philosophy meets Sociology |
| Programme > La philosophie rencontre la sociologie |
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K. Brad Wray
(University of
Alberta) Scientific Specialisation |
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As Kuhn notes, "over time a diagram of the evolution of scientific fields [and] specialties ... comes to look strikingly like a layman's diagram for a biological evolutionary tree" (1991, 7-8). It is agreed that the creation of a new scientific specialization is a complex process, involving both social and epistemic or cognitive changes. On the social side, scientific specializations are characterized by groups of people concerned with the same problems. They conference together, publish in the same journals, compete for funding, and often collaborate with one another. But, scientific specializations are also thought to reflect differences that are epistemically significant, for example methodological differences. A thorough account of scientific change should include an analysis of the processes by which new scientific specializations are created. A key to developing an adequate account is to explain how the epistemic and social dimensions relate. My aim in this paper is to advance our understanding of scientific specialization. I examine three competing accounts of the processes that lead to the creation of new specializations, and distinguish between accounts which emphasize the social dimension of the change and those that emphasize the epistemic dimension. I argue that a modified version of Kuhn's account, which suggests that lexical changes in science are the principal cause of the creation of new specializations, is the account best supported by the available evidence. I also suggest that this dimension of Kuhn's account of scientific change provides insight into understanding his resistance to the charge of irrationalism.
Department
of Philosophy
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