LIN 9960

Rethinking
Innateness

STUDY
QUESTIONS

Chapter One

  1. What is the relationship between complex behaviors and arms/leg?
  2. Explain learning vs. triggering innate knowledge.
  3. "Not the kind of interaction where black and white yield grey": elaborate.
  4. Explain the significance of the nematode C. elegans.
  5. What does the discovery of cortical plasticity tell us?
  6. What information do PET MRI ERP MEG AND EEG give us, why is "additional constraint" needed on this information, and where will such a constraint come from?
  7. Explain the relevance of human aphasics to connectionist simulation.
  8. In what sense is Sejnowski and Rosenberg's system able to 'read'?
  9. Explain the 'U-shape' and 'readiness' phenomena that cnxists claim to explain and model. [1]
  10. What do human and chimpanzee embryos tell us?
  11. What do "single action" genes tell us and what is an example of the other kind of gene?
  12. What is the difference between a worm and a chimpanzee with respect to genome and phenotype?
  13. Explain mosaic development and the alternative kind and the advantages of each.
  14. "Interactionist theories have in the past seemed either trivial or too complex" - explain.
  15. What is the difference between cortex being "equipotent" vs. "multipotent"?
  16. "There is virtually no interesting aspect of [human] development that is strictly genetic'..." - elucidate.
  17. Are universal outcomes sufficient diagnostics of innate mechanisms? [1] [2]
  18. If cortex is capable of encoding a vast array of representational types (give an example), what does this mean for representational innateness?
  19. Explain the idea of a 'cognitive module' (Fodor) how modules relate to the innateness issue, and what our authors' believe about modules.
  20. What has traditionally been assumed to follow logically from U-shaped curves in learning (e.g. children's learning of the past tense) and do our authors believe this assumption is correct?
  21. Summarize in your own words three important benefits of simulations in cognitive research. [1]
  22. If a simulation and a human both do the same thing, can we therefore assume that they must do it in the same way?
  23. Do our authors believe a behavior can be called 'innate' if it is nowhere specified in the genome? [1]
  24. One thing "we have learned from connectionist research is that considerably more information may be latent in the environment than was previously thought" (p. 16): Why is it interesting to know how much information may be latent in the environment?[1]  [2]
  25. Is connectionism necessarily an anti-nativist position? [1]